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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CORE
MEANING AND MARGINAL UNCERTAINTY
REED DIcKERsoN*
Somewhat like physicians, lawyers concerned with litigation or the
literature of litigation are generally preoccupied, so far as statutes are
concerned, with the pathology of the legislative process. Although this
preoccupation with sick' or intentionally uncertain statutes reflects for
the most part sound pedagogy and normal practice, it tends to warp the
lawyer's and the scholar's view of language in general and of legal language
in particular.
That the warping has been only partial is witnessed by the presence
in almost every discussion of statutory interpretation of an express or
implied, though sometimes grudging, admission that, despite the vicissitudes
of ambiguity, over-vagueness, and over-generality, most language is clear
in at least some of its applications. 2 Beyond this generally perfunctory
recognition, however, little direct attention has been given to the areas of
clear meaning, mainly because it is the legislative squeak that gets the
judicial oil.
On the other hand, a full-blown theory of the interpretation of statutes,
even though preoccupied with resolving significant uncertainties of meaning,
cannot deal adequately with uncertainty without taking account of the
basis for certainty in meaning and the bearing that the certain has on
the uncertain. Except for an utterance composed wholly of gibberish
(which would not be language), the character of a specific uncertainty
of meaning is shaped, at least in part, by the relevant certainties. Thus,
an ambiguity3 presupposes at least two particular alternatives each of
*Professor of Law, Indiana University. Commissoner for Indiana, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Author: LEGISLATIVE DRAr-
ING (1954).
1. I.e., ambiguous, over-vague, or over-general. See Dickerson, The Diseases
of Legislative Language, 1 HARV. J. ON LEG. 5 (1964).
2. "Inside, well on the inside, of the area of their meaning there will be
little or no doubt or obscurity or even disagreement." CuRTIs, IT'S YOUR LAW 62(1954). "Words . . . are after all not portmanteaus. We cannot quite put anything
we like into them. And we may not disregard them in statutes." Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 866 (1930).
3. In the traditional, limited sense of equivocation.
(1)
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which, taken alone, is free of ambiguity and not so vague as to be meaning-
less. Similarly, a margin of vagueness presupposes a non-marginal area
that, if free of ambiguity, is clear because it is, by hypothesis, non-vague.
In each case, the uncertainty thus relates to the presence or absence of
factors having a close affinity with those operating in the area of certainty.
Because little attention has been paid to the elements that make clear
language clear or how the elements of a particular uncertainty draw their
character from what in the relevant context is clear, a recent exchange
of views between Professor H. L. A. Hart4 and Professor Lon Fuller5 carries
special significance.
Hart's thesis is that communication is possible only because the gen-
eral words through which it is conducted have a core meaning or "standard
instance in which no doubts are felt about its application." 6 Around each
vague word there is a margin of uncertainty called the "penumbra." The
distinction between core and penumbra is important to Hart's larger thesis
that the core is the stronghold of the "isness" of the law, whereas the
penumbra is the arena to which issues of the nature and role of "oughtness"
in resolving uncertainties resulting from imprecision of legislative meaning
are confined. Hart's and Fuller's central dispute concerns the respective
roles of "isness" and "oughtness" in the law.
Although the larger issue is not the immediate concern of this dis-
cussion, it provides the setting in which the issues respecting the concept
of "standard instance" or "core meaning" must be seen. Most important
is the question: Does "oughtness" affect meaning in the core area? Fuller's
deepest concern about Hart's theory of standard instance or core meaning
lies in the assumption that it precludes recourse to the purpose of the
statute in cases falling within the core,7 thus sealing off the value-systems
with which the law should be in constant and intimate touch.
On core meaning, Hart supposes this situation:
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park.
Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller
skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? . . . If we are to
communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most elemen-
tary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a certain
4. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Htav. L. REV. 593
(1958).
5. Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 630 (1958).
6. Hart, op. cit. supra note 4, at 607.
7. Fuller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 662-66.
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type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general words we
use-like "vehicle" in the case I consider-must have some stan-
dard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application.
There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well,
a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously
applicable nor obviously ruled out.8
Fuller finds several bases for repudiating such a concept. His first
objection is that meaning is not conveyed by a mere sequence of single
words individually received and separately appraised. Because meaning
attaches, rather, to sentences, paragraphs, or whole pages of text (which
are likely to be unique), he argues:
Surely a paragraph does not have a "standard instance" that re-
mains constant whatever the context in which it appears. If a
statute seems to have a kind of "core meaning" that we can apply
without a too precise inquiry into its exact purpose, this is because
we can see that, however one might formulate the precise objective
of the statute, this case would still come within it.'
His second objection is that, even if we accept a word-by-word
approach to meaning, Hart fails to give a "real account of what does or
should happen" with respect to core meaning.o Fuller also says that even
within the alleged core meaning of the word "vehicle" Hart's insistence
that it obviously includes automobiles would produce a dubious result in
a case in which some citizens wanted "to mount on a pedestal in the park
a truck used in World War II," if the court paid no attention to what the
statute was intended to accomplish,"' Thus, he objects to Hart's assumption
that it is possible to interpret a word in a statute without knowing the
aim of the statute.
[W]e do not proceed simply by placing the word in some
general context ...Rather, we ask ourselves, What can this rule
be for? What evil does it seek to avert?12
... Surely the judicial process is something more than a cat-
aloguing procedure.'3
It is thus through the mediation of purpose that core meaning is affected
by considerations of "oughtness."
8. Hart, op. cit. supra note 4, at 607.
9. Fuller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 663.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 665.
13. Id. at 666.
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Fuller's third objection is that Hart's theory fails "to recognize that
a rule or statute has a structural or systematic quality that reflects itself in
some measure into the meaning of every principal term in it.' 41
Finally, he says that the theory of meaning implied in Hart's article
appears to have been rejected by three of the principal authorities on
modern logic: Wittgenstein, Russell, and Whitehead. 15
If Hart is propounding a word-by-word approach as a full-blown
theory of meaning, Fuller's criticism is largely justified. Certainly, a com-
munication is more than the sum of its verbal and syntactical parts and,
in the integration of total meaning, the legislative purpose manifest in
the context of particular use is the only intelligible unifying force. This is
well illustrated by Roscken v. Ward. 6 Although in that case the express
words of the relevant statute required no more than the presence of a
physician or an optometrist at each place where eye glasses were sold,
its clear purpose showed that it obligated him in each case either to
examine the customer's eyes or to determine that an examination was
unnecessary.
The question nevertheless remains whether Fuller's view of the role
of purpose rules out all notions of "standard instance" or "core meaning."
Although he denies core meaning to the word "vehicle," he can see "without
thinking" what the statute "is aiming at in general," with the result that
he has no difficulty in concluding that in every case "a noisy automobile
must be excluded."'' 7
Such an assurance invites these questions: By what means is the
legislative purpose so obviously manifested? Is Fuller's own certainty as
to purpose unrelated to any element of certainty in the individual words
of the statute? Are the words of a statute devoid of content when uttered
out of context?18
To this last question Whorf's belief that dictionary meanings derive
from the patterned "potentials of linkage" seems pertinent.9 Even in the
lonely isolation of their dictionary cells, words reflect the patterns of their
14. Id. at 669, note 40.
15. Id. at 669.
16. 279 U.S. 337 (1929).
17. Fuller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 663.
18. 'Vords are meaningless in isolation .. " ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING
474 (1958).
19. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY 67 note 4 (1956).
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many appearances in specific contexts.20 Dewey, although conceding that
"no term has logical force save in distinction from and relation to other
terms," adds:
This statement is not contradicted by the fact that all familiar
words carry some meaning even when uttered in isolation ...
Their meaning is potential rather than actual until they are linked
to other words. If the words sun, parabola, Julius Caesar, etc., are
uttered, a line of direction is given to observation or discourse.
But the objective of the direction is indeterminate until it is distin-
guished from alternative possible terminations, and is thus iden-
tified by means of relation to another term."
Thus, although "terms as such are logically conditioned by propositions," 22
they have content even apart from their specific contexts. This is true
even of syntactical links such as the word "unless," which Flesch has char-
acterized as the most difficult word in the English language.2 3 That this
content-out-of-context is likely to be very general, rather than specific, is
well illustrated by Fuller's word "improvement," which presumes that a
standard of value must be supplied by context before the word can take
on specific concretion.2 4 Clarity of meaning is thus a function of the reg-
ularity and consistency of particular patterns that, although they arise
out of particular uses, persist even beyond them.
Moreover, single words are not the only linguistic elements to which
ascertainable and measurable usages attach. For example, the term "parol
evidence rule" has a generally understood range of meaning even though
it is not a rule of evidence and even though it does not apply solely to
oral utterances. 25
Usage also shapes the ways in which words can be related to one
another. The conventions of word arrangement make it possible, for
example, to distinguish the meaning of "man bites dog" from the meaning
20. ". . . even when read out of specific context particular words and phrases
retain much of the flavor of their usual associations." Dickerson, The Difficult
Choice Between "And" and "Or," 46 A.B.AJ. 310, 311 (1960).
21. DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 349 (1938).
22. Ibid. Is it not also true that propositions as such are conditioned by
terms?
23. FLESCH, THE ART OF PLAIN TALK 167 (1946).
24. Cf. Fuller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 664-65.
25. "It is often fallacious in considering the meaning of a phrase consisting
of two words to find a meaning which each has separately and then infer that the
two together cover the combination so arrived at. The two together may, as here,
have acquired a special meaning of their own." Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great
Britain [1952], 2 Q.B. 329, 338 ("unfair competition").
1964]
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of "dog bites man." A combination of words and phrases can thus produce
a meaning that, while unique in the aggregate, is at least partly a function
not only of their established meanings but of the established meanings of
particular syntactical relationships. Fuller himself recognizes that "implicit
systematic or structural elements in language often enable us to understand
at once the meaning of a word used in a wholly novel sense, as in the state-
ment, 'Experts regard the English Channel as the most difficult swim in
the world.' -"O
Some syntactical usages are well recognized and expressly recorded.
Others are latent and subtle. The latter were apparently what Whorf had
in mind when he said:
A covert linguistic class may not deal with any grand dichotomy
of objects, it may have a very subtle meaning, and it may have
no overt mark other than certain distinctive "reactances" with
certain overtly marked forms. It is then what I call a CRYPTO-
TYPE. It is a submerged, subtle, and elusive meaning, correspond-
ing to no actual word, yet shown by linguistic analysis to be func-
tionally important in the grammar.
A third kind of specific usage that colors or supplements meaning
includes the relevant assumptions that are left tacit because by usage
they are not only agreed on but may be taken for granted. 28 Perhaps
the simplest example is the one suggested by Scriven.29 When the writer
of a document dates it "1/4/64," intending to refer to January 4, 1964
(rather than to April 1, 1964), he is tacitly assuming that his addressee,
like himself, is operating under the usual American, rather than British
or military, system of indicating dates. In general, tacit legislative assump-
tions are established usages, common to the legislators and the legislative
audience to which the particular statute is addressed, that are both
relevant to the legislative message and taken account of by it. As integral
parts of the shared environment, they are matters of which a court is likely
to take judicial notice.
Although, as Hart suggests, a word, phrase, or syntactical relationship
may have a single, relatively standardized and therefore determinable
usage, it is much more likely to have a cluster of such usages. So far as
26. Fuller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 668 note 40.
27. WHoRF, op. cit. supra note 19, at 70 (see also 92).
28. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 666-70 (1947).
29. In Definitions, Explanations and Tkeories, in MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (Herbert Feigl and others, ed.) Vol. II. 99, at 133 (1958).
[Vol. 29
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these usages are interrelated, they comprise a family of usages and, if
they relate to different aspects of the same general referent, they may be
treated, not as separate words, but as inflections or other use-variants
of the same word.30 On the other hand, so far as the usages are unrelated,
they constitute a bundle of homonyms, each of which, when identified,
carries a standard instance or core meaning and may be treated for most
purposes as a separate word.3 '
Such an identifiable use-pattern, consisting of specific language and
the particular pattern of "actions into which it is woven," constitutes, in
Wittgenstein's terminology, a "language-game" that is played according
to the rules that custom has established for it.32 These rules, in turn, com-
prise the core meaning of the particular use-pattern.
Moreover, even when the cluster of usages is taken as a whole (i.e., when
the word is read apart from any particular use-pattern), it carries a core
meaning. For a family of related usages, a single, broader core meaning
attaches so far as they relate to the same general referent. For a family of un-
related usages or a bundle of homonyms, the "core meaning" consists simply
of the aggregate of the core meanings of the separate use-patterns. Accord-
ingly, the core meaning of a word taken out of context is in most cases
like a quiver of individually unique arrows each of which shares, in addition
to the same quiver, one or more aspects, such as the same size, weight,
color, or shape, with some, all, or none of the others. As an alternative,
Fuller has likened such a word to a number of keys on the same ring.
The distinction between the vague and the certain, even with respect
to single words, seems to be taken for granted by most philosophers of
language. This is hardly surprising, because the vague implies the non-
vague, and if it is proper to characterize some words in isolation as having
wide areas of vagueness, it is likewise proper to characterize others as
being relatively precise and certain. Although significant vagueness, like
significant ambiguity, is realized only in specific use, and although a word
or phrase is highly flavored by the particular context in which it appears,
it is useful to classify words and phrases according to their potentialities
for giving or avoiding trouble. Use in many specific legal contexts makes
it possible, for example, to classify the word "reasonable" as potentially
30. E.g., "run," "have run," "ran," "was running," etc.
31. E.g., "Well," the judge asked, "how well did the contractor build the
well?"
32. WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILosoPHcAL INVESTIGATIONS 5, 20, 27, 80, 109 (1953).
19641
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vague, and the word "children" as potentially ambiguous. This makes
possible a science of lexicography and the writing of dictionaries.
Here is Black's account of how certainty and uncertainty can be
predicated even of words taken in isolation:
The process of logical analysis of a language can be regarded as
the exhibition of a set of conventions for the use of symbols,
abstracted from the regularity of linguistic habits in some pos-
tulated speech community, and proceeding by a series of successive
approximations involving the use of "simplified" or "model" entities.
The vagueness of symbols in any such abstract system is a symp-
tom of the degree of deviation of the "model" language from the
empirically discoverable linguistic habits in the corresponding
speech communityA
Black's concept of an "empirically discoverable linguistic habit" seems
to approximate Hart's concept of "standard instance" or "core meaning."
Here, again, the definiteness of the habit, and thus the clarity of the
meaning that it generates, depends on who are assumed to be the "users
of the language."'' 4 These, in turn, define the relevant speech community.
(It may be important to know whether a statute is addressed to the gen-
eral public or to an elite technical group.) It is not surprising that in
concrete situations the line between the certain and the significantly un-
certain, between core and penumbra, is usually blurred.
Some notion of standard instance is implicit in the almost universal
assumption that there is a practical limit to the meaning that a specific
configuration of words is capable of bearing. The factors of usage that set
an outer limit to the penumbra are those that determine the existence
and extent of the core. The revelation of legislative purpose is similarly
circumscribed, because (1) so far as it is revealed by the enacted language
itself, it is no more certain than the language by which it is revealed, and
(2) so far as a purpose is revealed by elements (verbal or non-verbal)
other than the enacted language, constitutional requirements as to how
statutes must be enacted intervene to inhibit the wholesale extension of
that language. Because total specific context tends to be unique, what
do these relatively standardized inhibitions consist of except the estab-
lished use-patterns of specific words, phrases, syntactical relationships, and
tacitly shared assumptions?
33. BLACK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 28 (1949). Vagueness results not only
from the cognitive incapacities or variant purposes of particular users but, more
important, from minute, objective differences in degree in what is being observed.
34. Id. at 29.
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On the other hand, Hart's approach, taken alone, reflects the limitation
in Professor Charles W. Morris's behavioristic approach to meaning.35 It
ignores that the total meaning conveyed by a unique configuration of
symbols uttered in a unique context may be more than the sum of a series
of separate conditioned responses and that, in many cases, an act of induc-
tion or deduction (i.e., of "interpretation") is required of the reader, an
act shaped by the necessary presumption that the total communication is
intended to express a rational and integrated legislative purpose or con-
geries of related purposes.
In this process, the concept of standard instance with its penumbra
plays two important roles. First, it furnishes the basic data upon which
any later act of induction or deduction necessarily depends. Second, it
has a composite limiting effect on the ultimate range of meanings possible
even in a loose context.
Even if, in the interpretation of statutes, we must agree with Fuller
that the "judicial process is something more than a cataloguing procedure,"
it is partly a cataloguing procedure. Single words carry, even into context,
an important one-way significance: Their established ranges of connota-
tions set maximum limits on what the total communication can mean to
the audience addressed. That they do not fix minimum limits reflects the
normal functioning of context. Here, Fuller is fully justified in criticizing
Hart for saying that the word "vehicle" necessarily covers all automobiles
regardless of circumstances, including the circumstances of a narrower
legislative purpose disclosed by the total context. To say that standard
instance is immune to the forces of context is to deny what is perhaps the
central and most useful function of context: to limit otherwise over-general
language. Context makes it possible, for example, to include in a federal
statute a very general word such as "person" without incurring the slightest
iisk that it will be read as including persons wholly beyond the jurisdiction
of the United States.
However, the limitations so imposed by context do not affect the
general lexical meaning of an otherwise broad word. In the sentence, "A
special statute is undesirable in this case," there is no inconsistency in
saying that the word "statute" means statute in its usual broad sense,
even though the sentence as a whole refers to only one kind of statute.
The general meaning of a word is not necessarily the same as the meaning
35. MORRIS, SIGNS, LANGUAGE, AND BEHAVIOR (1949). See the discussion in
BLAcK, Op. cit. supra note 33, at 169-77.
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of the particular sentence or paragraph in which it appears. No legitimate
purpose is served by a contextual theory of meaning that treats the word
"statute" as changing its meaning simply because it carries a modifier.
The significant question in most cases is not the meaning of any con-
stituent word but the meaning of the entire sentence or provision, as con-
ditioned for that "language-game" by the standard instances and penum-
bras of the words "special," "statute," "undesirable," and "case," the
syntactical usages reflected, and the contextually implied, and therefore
tacit, legislative assumptions. For this reason, the concept of the general
stability of standard instance or core meaning need not be abandoned
merely because of the concomitant limitations of context.
Nor is the concept of standard instance or core meaning necessarily
denied by variations in shades of meaning provided by variations in
specific context. As with all classifications, lexical samenesses exist only
because the existing differences are insignificant in the light of the purpose
at hand, and thus may be disregarded.
If the concept of standard instance or core meaning is limited to par-
ticular words, phrases, syntactical relationships, and their use-patterns,
and if its composite effects are subject to the normal conditioning of con-
text, including the legislative purposes revealed by total context, there
is wide scope for the play of the value-systems reflected in expressed legis-
lative purpose, at least so far as context serves to limit the full potentialities
of standard instance. On the other hand, they cannot extend lexical
meaning beyond the outer reaches of standard instance and its penumbra
of uncertainty.
That context not only limits the sweep of otherwise over-general lan-
guage but also selects among homonyms and other use-patterns and often
resolves grammatical ambiguities, both without changing the general poten-
tial force of established usage, refutes any notion that the vital effect
that context has on total meaning rules out any concept of standard in-
stance or core meaning. On the contrary, it presupposes it. For this reason,
the mere recognition of the force of context found in Wittgenstein, Russell,
and Whitehead does not repudiate the notion of standard instance or core
meaning as such. At most it refutes Hart's apparent assertion that standard
instance and core meaning are invulnerable to the limiting force of context.
Russell's strictures on the "cult of common usage"86 seem directed,
36. See the essay, "The Cult of Common Usage," in RUSSELL, PORTRAITS
FROM MEMORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 154 (1956), reprinted in THE BAsIC WRITINGS
oF BERTRAND RUSSELL 137 (1961).
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not at the concept of common usage, but at what blind enthusiasm has
claimed for the vaguenesses and over-generalities that comprise much of
what passes as "plain English." It seems generally agreed among the
philosophers of language not only that common usage in a particular speech
community generates the conditioned responses upon which even unique
communications are built but also that such linguistic habits are empirically
and objectively discoverable. On this assumption are founded all notions
of clear meaning. Nor is this assumption undermined by the fact, made so
evident by Wittgenstein, 7 that even within the same speech community
the same word plays as many roles as there are identifiable use-patterns
that employ it.
To summarize, a full-bodied theory of interpretation should recognize
(1) that the common usage that makes clear language clear is not limited
to individual words taken in isolation, (2) that by usage, combinations of
words often carry meanings independent of the meanings of their con-
stitutent parts, (3) that usage extends also to observed patterns of syntax
and to shared tacit legislative assumptions, (4) that the same word, ex-
pression, syntactical pattern, or tacit assumption may have multiple com-
mon usages, (5) that each such usage relates to a particular speech com-
munity, and (6) that patterns of context are to a limited extent reflected
in the dictionary meanings of words. Crowning these facts is the integrating
force of legislative purpose. Hart's views as expressed on the occasion of
this exchange with Fuller may not have been wrong so much as they failed
to include other equally important aspects of communication.
These observations, of course, do not detract from the validity of
Fuller's main points: (1) that a legislative communication is presumably
both an integrated whole and inherently purposive, (2) that knowledge
of this fact not only is helpful in resolving many uncertainties of meaning,
but conditions the normal play of established usage, and (3) that where
the immediate legislative purpose is clearly revealed by the pertinent
statutory language read in proper context its meaning is clear.
Although Fuller has effectively punctured any notion that standard
instance or core meaning is impervious to context and the value-systems
inherent in manifest legislative purpose, a concept of standard instance
or core meaning is indispensable to setting outer limits on potential meaning
and, indeed, even to the revelation of legislative purpose itself. If so,
37. Op. cit. supra note 32.
12 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
Hart is right in supposing standard instance or core meaning, but wrong in
dissociating it from the limiting implications of legislative purpose. It is
unfortunate, too, that he did not delineate more fully its extent and signif-
icance, because therein lies the source of legislative clarity.
